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THE PROBLEM OF THE PHILIPPINES.

BY THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, BART., M. P.; THE
HON. JOHN BARRETT, LATE UNITED STATES MINISTER
TO SIAM ; AND HUGH H. LUSK.

I.

THE editor has asked me to write, even if I can only write briefly, on the probable outcome of the war, and calls my attention to the fact that influential opinions are being expressed by leading men in the United States against a departure from the traditional policy of the country, or that recommended by Washington, and against any annexation of territory or acquisition of protectorates. This is an American question, in which the advice of an Englishman is an impertinence, even if he has a clear view and, consequently, advice to give. There are, however, some considerations of a general nature which affect the matter, and which, although secondary, are worth taking into account.

It seems to me impossible for the United States to hand back to such a colonial rule as that of Spain populations who have been emancipated from that rule by the action of the great Republic, or by the chances of war. It seems to me almost as impossible for the United States to sell people like sheep, and to be a party to

arrangements which, for example, would hand over the Philippines to another power against the wish of their inhabitants. It is probable that the inhabitants of the Philippines would prefer the rule of the United States, or a United States protectorate, to British or German rule; and, further, the handing over of the Philippines to any other country would be attended with immense risk of general war.

I understand that the leader of the Philippine insurrection has already arranged with the United States Admiral to set up a republic, which could not, without American protection, have any chance of permanence, but which might, in the opinion of those who know the islands best, if aided by a strong officer, succeed in maintaining authority and order. To restore the Philippines to Spain, to hand them over to another power, or to govern them as an integral part of the United States, seem to me, I confess, to be policies equally certain of rejection upon sound consideration; and the system of protectorate is, in my opinion, the inevitable outcome of the existing situation. All endeavors ought to be directed toward making it a success.

One of the reasons which, I understand, are given for the proposals to avoid responsibility in the Philippines, for example, if not also in the West Indies, is that the United States do not possess a trained Colonial service. That difficulty is probably exaggerated. The British Colonial service, and the British Foreign Office service—and it must be remembered that the Foreign Office here administers vast territories, such as the British East African protectorate and the Central African protectorate (which is, in fact, a colony where there is nothing to protect)—are partly filled with trained men, but they also contain among their public servants gentlemen who have been brought from other professions into their posts abroad, and they have to deal with some most unhealthy climates, to which it is not easy to get anybody at all to go. Then, the Foreign Office has had to take over from chartered companies men who have themselves, in some cases, been put into their service without training or preparation. The personal difficulties caused by the rapid extension of our rule in Africa have been very great, and we are far, indeed, from possessing there, in great portions of our territory, a Civil Service similar to, or at all comparable with, that which in India forms one of the greatest glories of our rule. One administrator of Uganda was

forced by the paucity of his staff to give a province to his valet; and yet, on the whole, our men have shown themselves worthy of the confidence which has been reposed in them almost by chance. Young guardsmen and other soldiers have conducted civil administrations, in some cases with remarkable success, under the accumulation of every possible circumstance of difficulty; and I cannot but think that there must be plenty of men in the United States of a similar type.

There is some democratic dislike, I think, of the idea of selecting men from your navy, which, like the navy of the French Republic, is an aristocratic service. Why are navies always aristocratic? Even in this country, while the non-commissioned officer of the army often rises to commissioned rank, in the navy this never happens; and I believe that in the case of the United States the quarter-deck is as completely free from the presence of promoted warrant officers, or men from the lower deck, as is the case in the navy of France or the United Kingdom. Still, if any democratic prejudice on this score could be got over, what admirable administrators for the Philippines would American naval officers make!

CHARLES W. DILKE.

II.*

IN the capture and occupation of the Philippines the United States will be confronted by one of the gravest and yet most interesting problems in the history of our foreign relations. The President, Congress—and the people who develop the sentiment that guides the executive and legislative branches of our Government in their acts—have before them, in the determination of what shall be done with the Philippines, a question second only in importance to that of the fate of Cuba, and possibly involving equally serious issues and international complications.

The great European powers and Japan are deeply concerned in the future of the Philippines. They recognize that the nation holding them—if one of the first magnitude—will have a vantage

* This article—which reached the *REVIEW* only in time for publication now—is unique in its interest because of the fact that it was written before the outbreak of hostilities between Spain and the United States. It addresses itself, nevertheless, to the situation in Eastern waters which has actually resulted from the war, the author having anticipated the question which the brilliant victory of Admiral Dewey suddenly thrust upon public consideration. As is well known, Mr. Barrett has made, for many years, a special study of the countries of the Far East in their relations to the development of American commerce.—Ed. N. A. R.

ground of inestimable strategical and commercial value; and they will watch with a more jealous attitude the disposition of these islands, matchless in wealth and location, than they will the fate of Cuba.

The Philippines are the southern key to the Far East; they hold a position in the South not much less important than that of Japan in the North; the South China Sea, the pathway of the numberless steamers and ships that come to the Far East by the Suez and Cape Town routes, is under the eye, as it were, of Manila; a fleet of warships could sail from Manila Bay, scour this Mediterranean of the East, and return to signal Corregidor island in four days; all this, I mean, if some first-class power, like America, England, France, Germany or Japan controlled the islands.

The American people, I fear, do not appreciate the actual importance of the Philippines, their wealth and resources, their location and possibilities, their area and population. I will intimate no reflection whatever on our distinguished Executive, for whom I have profound admiration, nor on Congress, whose splendid support of the President at the critical moment I have with pride described to my friends of other nationalities in the Far East; but I draw my conclusions from the apparent unpreparedness of our Government to support Commodore Dewey with supply and troopships, as well as with more war vessels, if he intends to descend on Manila, and the Spanish Government shall reinforce their present naval and military strength in the East Indies with battleships and troops before the United States can reinforce its Asiatic fleet; from the ignorance of the conditions, customs, and wants of the inhabitants displayed in numerous letters received from representative business houses; from the flippant and satirical tone of many writers and newspaper contributors who have apparently never visited the islands; and from a critical survey of most of the matter printed in America about the cities of Manila, Iloilo, Cebú, and their commerce and trade, as well as general descriptions of Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, Panay, Mindoro, Leyte, Negros and other islands of the group.

If anyone doubts the strategical and commercial importance of the Philippines, he should obtain a map of the Far East and study carefully that splendid coast line of Eastern Asia that reaches from Singapore and Bangkok to Tientsin and Vladivostock, with its many ports, its mighty rivers, its general greatness and its

sheltered seas guarded by such island lands or groups as Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Borneo, Java and Sumatra. It has no equal in the wide world. And along this coast and among all these islands none stands out more prominently than the Philippines, over which the American flag may yet float. There are those who will call me a dreamer, an enthusiast, and a framer of fantasies, but my conclusions are based on accurate information of the Philippines, their cities, their open ports and their distant inland country. I have summarized the opinions of those who know the people and have studied their natures and capabilities. I have myself carefully investigated their resources—forest, agricultural, mineral and animal.

The purpose of this article does not include a description of the Philippines, and of Manila, their famous capital. In the **REVIEW** for February, 1897, under the caption, "The Cuba of the Far East," I endeavored in brief terms to execute that commission. Nor shall I discuss the unhappy features of government, so often the subject of comment. The main point of my argument—with due regard for the views of others, but with the confidence and earnestness born of many years' experience and travel in the Far East, and continued association with those who have mastered the field—is that the United States Government, if it seizes the Philippines, should consider deliberately and thoroughly all phases of the question: What shall be the ultimate disposition of the islands in the light of their great strategical and commercial importance?

These four propositions can be outlined as representing the different policies that can be followed by the United States in determining the future of the Philippines:

1. They can be held as a permanent possession, colony, territory, or State of the United States.
2. They can be returned to Spain on the payment of a war indemnity.
3. They can be given their independence.
4. They can be sold to some nation (other than Spain) under favorable conditions, or exchanged for certain of its possessions or for reciprocal advantages.

Of these eventualities it would now seem that the first or fourth is more likely of realization than the second or third. It is a grave question whether Spain would be able to pay such war

indemnity as the United States would demand, if a conflict is prolonged and its cost runs into the hundreds of millions. It is true that assistance might be offered from Rome, in view of the vast Church interests in the Philippines; or that some friendly power might act as security, itself holding the islands as a hostage until the debt was liquidated. But both these possibilities are doubtful. The United States might, even then, hesitate to deliver the Philippines until the indemnity was fully paid; and, under the influence of American occupation for a number of years, conditions of freedom of life, worship, administration and trade would develop that would completely change the status of affairs, and make it impossible for Spain to hold and govern them, even were they turned over to her.

The independence of the islands may sound well, but the reasons for it are far outweighed by those against it. A cardinal point is that the natives themselves are not equal to it. The masses of population are totally unprepared for such a change, and the leaders who are both able and honest are so very few that, were independence granted, the islands would descend into constant civil wars and develop conditions that would either compel the United States to exercise a costly supervision over them, or cause another power, like England, France, Japan or Germany, to take them for the protection of their own interests there. What is more, the natives, including the insurgent leaders, do not themselves expect nor ask for independence. If they are sincere in what they have said to me, and to others who have mingled with them, the chief desideratum they seek is actual and lasting reform of the present abuses, especially the grinding taxation that keeps the majority of them in comparative poverty. Had Spain executed the reforms promised time and time again, or had she deliberately undertaken a system of colonial government such as exists in the British possessions of India or in those of Holland in Java, it is altogether probable that there would be no insurgent party of strength in the Philippines. If the United States occupies the islands, the object of the insurgents will be to show such strength in co-operating with the United States forces, and such a general demand for reforms, that they will at once be recognized by the United States as a power in the Philippines, and hence that they will receive immediately the reforms sought; or that they will be made such a party to any treaty embodying the

delivery of the islands to another nation that their rights will be forever assured. Were the United States to signify the intention of holding the Philippines as a colony, the natives would be content and drop all agitation for independence and for reforms, knowing that the latter would surely come with the organization of a provisional government.

The proposition to make the Philippines a permanent possession of the United States will no doubt seem at first impracticable and be strongly opposed as against precedent, traditional policy, and the best interests of the American people. It will be argued that we could never grant actual citizenship to 7,000,000 Philipinos, and that, unless the islands are made a State or an integral part of the Union, we would have no adequate system of government for them, and that the experience would be a sad one. The contention would also be advanced that the expense of fortifying and garrisoning Manila and other points, and of protecting them with an ample naval force, would be a burden we should not undertake to carry. Perhaps the strongest adverse argument will be that the permanent occupation will place us on the same basis with European nations as a foreign colonial power, and make us a party to all international entanglements in either Asia or Europe, and destroy the splendid New World isolation that gives the Monroe doctrine its breath of life. If we do not even intend to annex Cuba at our very doors, it may seem foolish to consider the permanent possession of the Philippines, which are nearly 7,000 miles distant from our Pacific shores.

On the other hand, there are grave reasons why we should not surrender this group of islands—more resourceful and greater in area, population and opportunities than Cuba, and so situated as to command the commerce and trade of the Far East and the routes thereof—without careful consideration of the advantages that might follow ownership. I would not intimate that I actually favor permanent possession, because then I would be defeating the chief point of my argument, that the United States should consider all sides of the question deliberately before taking final action, by myself jumping to a conclusion before it is definitely known what is best.

If conditions, precedents, law, the Constitution, and traditional policy are against colonization, is it not possible, after a great war that has no respect for precedents and traditions and

evolves entirely new conditions, that our Constitution or laws shall be so modified as to permit a system of colonial or dependent government? If the American people will undertake a mighty war with all its dangers, horrors, and cost, can they be too conservative to permit the passage of such enactments as will provide a safe government for the Philippines, without granting that degree of citizenship in such a colony as will permit actual voting powers in the United States. Other nations, particularly Great Britain, have so perfectly developed this system that we have abundant data and precedent in determining what is the best method.

But what have we to gain by taking possession of the Philippines and holding them as a colony or dependent State?

(1.) We would have an unsurpassed point in the Far East from which to extend our commerce and trade and gain our share in the immense distribution of material prizes that must follow the opening of China, operating from Manila as a base, as does England from Hong Kong.

(2.) As England has Hong Kong and Singapore, France Saigon, Germany Kiaochow, Russia Port Arthur, the United States would have the great city of Manila as an American capital in the Far East, from which to extend both our material and moral influence where vast interests are at stake, and through which the United States could keep in closest touch with all developments.

(3.) We would have, in the Philippines themselves, one of the greatest undeveloped opportunities in all the world—a group of islands with numberless riches and resources awaiting exploitation, and capable of providing a market for a large quantity of our manufactured products.

(4.) We would have in Manila a large and wealthy city and commercial *entrepot*, located on one of the finest harbors in the world, and backed up by a country that outranks Japan in variety of resources, but which is not much more developed in the interior than Borneo.

(5.) The steamers and ships that now ply between San Francisco, Portland, Tacoma and Seattle in the United States, and Yokohama, Shanghai and Hong Kong in the Far East, would either make Manila their ultimate destination or have adequate connections with it, thus placing the ports, merchants, and manufacturers in closer relations with all Asia than ever before.

(6.) The Islands would easily be self-supporting in the matter of government after they were once placed in running order, and they should provide an abundant revenue for improvements of all kinds, even to harbor defences and other fortifications, thus removing the great danger of proving a financial burden to ourselves. This is apart from the profits resulting to America and American interests in trade exchange, and in exploiting the resources of this wonderful group, which includes over 1,500 islands, and has a combined area equal to that of New York and New England together.

(7.) The present situation demonstrates the vital necessity of having a naval (as well as a commercial) base in Asiatic waters. The moment neutrality is declared our fleet has no place in which to rendezvous, to coal, or to repair, and is 7,000 miles from the nearest home port! We hope, and are confident, that our ships will be more than a match for the Spanish fleet at Manila, but, supposing they are unsuccessful, where can they go to recoup and recoup? Assuming that they defeat the Spanish squadron and a more powerful one comes out from Spain to meet them, where can they put in for protection or preparation if they are not equally matched, or if some of the ships are unfit for action?

(8.) The growing importance of the Pacific, of Pacific commerce, Pacific politics, Pacific lands, and the responsibilities resting on the United States in connection with that growth, together with the impending opening of China and the wide reaching effect thereof upon the United States as well as upon Europe, demand that we do not shirk the duty of governing the Philippines, which must play a leading part in all this development. What with the cutting of the Nicaragua Canal, the annexation of Hawaii, the laying of a Pacific cable, the rapid progress of our Pacific Coast interests, the increase in our trade with the Far East, and the necessity of finding wider foreign markets for our surplus products, is it too much to expect that we shall endeavor to hold the Philippines as a permanent possession if we succeed in taking them from Spain?

The other alternative and fourth proposition of ultimate disposal—that of selling to another power or exchanging for reciprocal advantages—is assuredly worthy of practical investigation, but there are two very serious obstacles in the way. One is that few if any powers would pay our price, or give us in exchange

what we would ask. Another is the probable objection of other European powers to one of their number obtaining such an overwhelming advantage in the East as would plainly result from the possession of the Philippines, and the vigorous protests that would be aroused, which in time might lead to most serious diplomatic differences with countries whose good will we would otherwise keep. If we would sell or exchange, we would naturally turn first to Great Britain, because her commercial policy would be favorable to our interests, and she is the only important nation that has possessions which we would want in exchange. If Great Britain would give us her outposts off our Atlantic Coast, like Bermuda and the Bahamas, together with Jamaica or some of the Windward Islands, in exchange for the Philippines, we should not be losers in the end, but England might not think as favorably of the bargain as we, while France might interpose objections that her coast of Annam and Cambodia should be flanked by British Philippines. Neither France nor Germany has colonies that we would accept in exchange, and in view of their alleged kindly feelings towards Spain it is doubtful if they would endeavor to buy of us, while England would probably object strenuously to France's absolutely controlling the China Sea, as would be the case if she owned the Philippines. Japan is undoubtedly a power that would be only too glad to possess them, and she is even now gazing upon them with anxious eyes; but Japan could hardly afford to pay the price and she has nothing to give us in exchange. After Great Britain, American sentiment would presumably favor Japan, provided she would vouchsafe full commercial rights for America. I would not intimate that we have any antipathy for French or German possession as French or German, but the commercial methods and policies of those lands do not seem to favor us as do those of England.

My observations on this point of disposal to another power are purely speculative; for no one can tell what war may bring forth and what new turn our foreign relations may take in consequence. But they may serve in a slight degree to awaken interest in a vital issue, if the fortunes of war shall give the Philippines to the United States.

In conclusion, it behooves me to state that these opinions and arguments are written before war is declared between Spain and the United States, but when the announcement is momentarily

expected. If, therefore, there are certain propositions and inferences not in accord with what shall have developed between the day of preparation and that of publication, I ask the forbearance of those who might otherwise deem my conclusions strange and incompatible with existing conditions.

Whether we capture and hold the Philippines, or Spain shall successfully resist our efforts, on the one hand, or war shall not bring us face to face with the specific problems outlined, the truth remains, beyond question or quibble, that now is the critical time when the United States should strain every nerve and bend all her energies to keep well to the front in the mighty struggle that has begun for the supremacy of the Pacific Seas. If we seize the opportunity we may become leaders forever, but if we are laggards now we will remain laggards until the crack of doom. The rule of the survival of the fittest applies to nations as well as to the animal kingdom. It is a cruel, relentless principle being exercised in a cruel, relentless competition of mighty forces; and these will trample over us without sympathy or remorse unless we are trained to endure and strong enough to stand the pace.

JOHN BARRETT.

III.

THE fortunes of war have placed the Philippine Islands at the disposal of this country. In doing so, they have prepared for America a problem perhaps the most difficult of all which the war will be responsible for, and probably the one which is the least understood. It is not too much to say that very few persons in the United States know anything of the Philippines, their present condition, or their inhabitants. Most of us know, indeed, where the islands lie, and that the group contains many islands, certainly numbering more than a thousand, of which ten are of considerable size; that the islands are rich in soil, and highly tropical in climate; that their area is considerably greater than that of the British islands; and finally that they contain six or seven millions of native inhabitants.

But the present position of this country in its relations to these islands and to Spain imperatively demands that both the Government and the people of the United States should know a good deal more than this. Admiral Dewey's victory at Manila was not

merely a brilliant naval action. It was one of those events that mould history. For the time at least Spain's empire in the Pacific was destroyed along with her fleet, and, unless by the action of this country, it cannot possibly be restored. Nor is this all. The victory served the purpose of encouraging, consolidating, and rendering successful the native revolt against Spanish authority in the island of Luzon, which was otherwise hardly possible. Both these results—neither of which was or could have been foreseen—have rendered the victory of Manila a turning point in the history of this country also. Nations, like individuals, never escape the consequences of their own actions, and in the present case the working of this universal law is likely to be more than ordinarily self-evident.

The islands, practically at our disposal to-day, have been possessed—it would be a perversion of language to say that they had been either occupied or governed—for nearly three centuries by Spain, and our victory has put an end to that possession. The natives have been claimed as subjects of the Spanish crown; many of them—though almost entirely in one island of the group—have been the victims of Spanish oppression and misgovernment during most of the period; to a very limited extent they have learned the Spanish language, and a considerable number of them have been, nominally at least, converted to Christianity by Spanish missionaries; and, finally, it may be said that with very few exceptions they have conceived a very hearty dislike for their Spanish taskmasters. This dislike, rendered effective by the defeat at Manila, has enabled the insurgents of the island of Luzon to defy Spain and set up at least a nominal government of their own. It represents only a part of the people of Luzon, and can hardly be said to control even those whom it represents, but undoubtedly it stands for the fact that the sympathies of the inhabitants of Luzon—the only island intimately acquainted with Spanish methods of government—are with anybody who opposes Spain.

The problem of the Philippines is not a simple one, indeed it is not even a single one, but consists of two very distinct parts which may demand somewhat different solutions before any justice can be done to either. To make this clear, it becomes necessary to state more fully the actual situation as it is to-day, and also as it has been under the so-called Spanish dominion of the islands.

For nearly three centuries past Spain has professed not only to own but also to occupy the Philippine islands, and in a certain very limited sense she has done so, with the exception of a short time early in this century, when they were taken from her by Great Britain, as this country has taken them now. This is only correct, however, so far as the outside world is concerned. Spain has never in fact either owned or occupied the islands as a whole. What she has really owned, and to some extent occupied, is the island of Luzon, the largest of the group, where she founded the city of Manila and several smaller towns. In this island she established a government, which, if neither just nor enlightened, was largely operative, and here she made serious efforts to Christianize and civilize the natives. Luzon, however, is only one of ten large islands in the group, the united areas of the others greatly exceeding its own, and it is believed to be far from the richest of the group in natural resources. Like the others, it is mountainous, but, unlike some of them, it has not been proved to contain any minerals of value for purposes of trade or commerce. Parts of the island are unquestionably productive, and, in better hands than either the natives or their Spanish masters, it might long before this time have been nearly as rich a possession for Spain as Java has long been for Holland. But there is no reason to believe that it is nearly so rich, or could be made nearly so productive, in any hands, as some of the more southerly islands of the group, which contain richer soil and are situated nearer to the equator.

Luzon is the most temperate in climate of the Philippine group. By far the larger part of the island lies to the north of Manila, between the fifteenth and nineteenth parallels of latitude, and that section of the island contains the only districts likely to prove very largely productive, even if they are made the most of by the application of energy and capital. It is not to be forgotten that a great difference exists between islands lying within the tropics near a continent like our own or Asia, and those that lie in the midst of the ocean, like the Philippine group. In their case ten or fifteen degrees of latitude make a very appreciable difference in climate, especially in the matter of rainfall, which is in tropical climates the great factor in production. For this reason, the southern Philippines will be found to be the richest islands for the production of nearly every kind of crop which

has the special value attaching to tropical vegetation in the markets of the world.

It is these southern islands of the group over which Spain has at no time exercised more than the most nominal authority. As a matter of fact, they are almost unexplored, and unknown even to Spanish travellers; their inhabitants have never dreamed of acknowledging any practical authority over them on the part of Spanish officials, except at a few points on the sea coast; they do not speak the language, obey the laws, or profess the religion of the Europeans who have nominally ruled the country for two centuries and a half. The chief of the islands are Mindanao, the most southerly and, next to Luzon, the largest and most populous of the group; Leyte and Samar, lying directly to the north and continuing the chain of more recent and active volcanic forces which begin with the lofty volcanic mountain at the very southernmost point of the group; and the islands of Bohol, Sebu, Negros and Panay, which lie to the west out of the main line of volcanic disturbance, and are the only parts of the group that are known to contain minerals of extent and value. In these islands and their future, there lies to-day the most difficult part of the problem which is involved in our new acquisition.

It cannot be too emphatically insisted upon that the Philippines are, for all practical purposes, a country of possibilities rather than of any considerable present value. The soil is for the most part of that rich volcanic character which seems, in conjunction with tropical heat and rains, to produce the richest vegetation of the most valued kinds; the natives, while entirely uncivilized, and practically independent, which really means without government of any kind, are not as a rule hard to deal with, nor are they usually unfriendly to strangers, or averse to Europeans; and the influence of Christianity, so far as it has gone, has prepared the way for that intercourse with superior races which lays the foundation of civilization. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the native races of these islands have all the vices of their condition. Less even than those of Luzon are they at all inclined to exert themselves to do any useful work. At present they have no idea either of self-government or of permitting anyone else to govern them. Accustomed to the domestic tyranny of their chiefs as their normal condition, and to small tribal wars as their common employment, they present by no means a

very hopeful field for the operations which are to develop their resources or to elevate their condition.

The people of Luzon, it must always be remembered, are not only not in the same condition as those of the southern islands—they are not the same people at all. The race is different; the language—or rather the languages, for there are many, more distinct than French and English—is in no way similar; the manners, customs and habits of the tribes differ widely from those of the northern island, and also from one another. It might be possible, though it is probable that the experiment would be attended with much risk and trouble, to proclaim a protectorate over Luzon and to allow the natives to try for themselves the experience of self-government. Possibly, it might not be a more disastrous failure than similar experiments have been in some of our own Central American Republics. It could not, and would not in any case, extend to the southern islands. By no possible stretch of imagination could it be supposed that the Presidency or Dictatorship of Aguinaldo or any other leader of Luzon extended to the independent, and more than equally warlike and populous, islands lying nearer the equator, and it would be impossible to expect European nations to respect the transparent fiction to the disregard of their own interests, as soon as the troops of this country were withdrawn from the islands.

It does not rest with America to say whether or not the islands of the southern Philippines shall be self-governing, for in their present condition nothing can make them so. If the islands were returned to Spain, indeed, they might remain in something like the condition they have been in so long, which is one of non-government, but certainly not of anything which can by any stretch of courtesy be called self-government. Spain, in her exhausted condition, would be less able than ever either to control or to civilize the natives; less likely, if possible, than ever to do anything toward developing the resources of the group. In such a case it would only be a question of time until it dawned on Spanish statesmen, and even on the Spanish people, that they had nothing to gain by keeping this feeble ghost of their departed foreign empire, but much to gain by selling it to some other European power. The new departure might well be for the better—indeed, it could hardly be for the worse, whether France, Germany, or even Russia, became the buyer—but it could not in that

case be said that this country had faced the problem which her own actions had produced. It might on the contrary be said with truth that, having entered upon a war in the great cause of humanity and advancing civilization, she had used its favorable results as far as they served her own purposes, and fell in with her own most direct interests, by freeing Cuba and taking charge of Porto Rico, but that she had cast away the future of considerably more than double as large a population, when she found that the problem of their civilization was not an easy one, and might not, at any rate for many years, be a directly profitable one.

To return the island of Luzon to Spain is, indeed, hardly possible for America. A restoration which would be possible of acceptance by a proud nation like the Spaniards must be an untrammelled restoration. Such a restoration was made by Great Britain after the Napoleonic wars more than eighty years ago, with the result that the lapse of nearly a century has seen no real improvement in the condition of the islands or their people. In that case, however, there was practically no choice. Britain could have done little or nothing with or for the country, and Spain had not really been the enemy of England except upon Napoleon's compulsion. The position to-day is, in all respects, a different one. Spain has had her opportunity for three-quarters of a century or more, in the light of modern sentiment and modern example, to govern and civilize the Philippines, and her failure is complete. She has applied the methods of two centuries ago to the country and people, with the result that her government is less beneficial and more impossible now than it was then. Should Spain now be restored to what she unquestionably regards as her rights of sovereignty in the Philippines, her first step must be a renewal of the atrocities of her war in Cuba. The soldiers deported from Cuba and Porto Rico at the expense of this country, would be employed—nay, they must be employed—in reducing to subjection the rebels of Luzon, who have acted in concert with ourselves, and have gone far to render our operations successful—to such a subjection as was proposed for Cuba. Such a position only needs to be faced to be recognized for what it is—impossible.

And to return the southern Philippines to Spain is to return them to the condition of hopeless stagnation and barbarism in which two centuries and a half of nominal occupation and control by that country have left them. Spain would assuredly be in no

better condition to civilize her distant dependency when war had exhausted her treasury and demoralized her government. She would be no more likely to engage with energy and enterprise in the task of developing the resources and elevating the inhabitants of the Philippines than during all the years of comparative prosperity at home. If there was a change at all, it would inevitably be a change for the worse—though indeed, to those who know by personal observation what she has done, or rather what she has left undone, in her dominions of the southern Philippines, such a change seems hardly possible.

But, it may be said, there is still the expedient of a protectorate, jointly with Spain herself, if she will, but in any case an American protectorate, under which the people of these neglected islands may learn to govern themselves and develop their own resources. It may be said with confidence that the idea of a joint protectorate is an impossible dream. Spain could gain nothing by such an arrangement, and her pride would prompt her rather to abandon the last shreds of her colonial empire than to submit to the constant control of this country in dealing with her emancipated subjects. If it were possible, moreover, it would prove a hopeless failure. Of all protectorates, a joint one is under any circumstances the very worst, as experience has shown conclusively in the case of Samoa; and where the powers which it gave were to be exercised by a victorious and a defeated nation jointly, it would either be a farce, or it would shortly develop into a tragedy.

Nor would America's sole protectorate in any degree meet the difficulties of the case. A protectorate supposes a government which is to be protected and maintained, and no such government either does or can exist, at any rate in the greater part of the Philippine group. A republic of Luzon would probably prove a failure so complete as to make Spanish domination appear beneficent by comparison, but a republic of Mindanao, Sebu, or Negros would at present be a simple impossibility. The natives could neither understand its methods nor its objects even in the smallest degree, and no one tribe out of the eight or ten, now totally distinct, could hope to work in concert with another. If indeed it were conceivable that a small body of American or European adventurers should settle in these islands, they might in the course of time repeat—though under circumstances of far greater diffi-

culty and danger—the process which has, perhaps happily, ended in the annexation of Hawaii by this country. The one condition which renders this impossible, even if it were in any sense desirable, is that no time would be allowed for the development of the project. Whatever America proposes to do in the Philippines she must do quickly, and she must do it decisively. It is something worse than idle to suppose that she could by any possibility extend a Monroe doctrine to the islands of the Oriental Archipelago, and, having authorized the institution of a native anarchy under the name of self-government, call upon the nations of Europe to respect its excesses on the ground that they were perpetrated under the shadow of her protecting flag. Such an assumption of power would inevitably defeat its own purpose, and its only logical result would be to launch this nation upon a long and disastrous career of warfare, if not of conquest.

As matters stand, our choice is a limited one. We may, if we are prepared to do so, abandon the Philippine islands to Spain at the end of the war. We may, if a feeling of shame does not prevent, declare in effect that, having secured the freedom of Cuba, which we regarded as essential to our own comfort, and the well-being of our own people who had invested money there, and having taken possession of Porto Rico, which we regarded as of special value to us for strategic and other reasons, we are satisfied. In that case we have only to abandon all claims upon the Philippines which the war may have given us, and to hand over the Philippine insurgents in Luzon to their inevitable fate at the hands of Spain. By this course it may as well be admitted we shall save money, and we shall also wash our hands of not a few embarrassing questions and anxious responsibilities. It may be as well to remind ourselves, however, as a nation, that the process of hand-washing does not always serve as a satisfactory solution of a difficult problem. The Nemesis of national responsibilities declined is as real and as relentless in its vengeance as that of national wrongs committed, and no easy-going assumption of indifference can save any nation from its retribution. It is true that nothing was farther from the mind of the Government and people of America, when they entered upon a war with Spain, than burdening themselves with distant dependencies, but it is no new experience that nations, like individuals, are to a large extent at the mercy of the events unexpectedly following on their own

actions. The question which will demand an answer is not what we intended when we began the war with Spain; it is not even altogether what we professed at that time as our intentions and wishes; it is only to a limited extent what we desire and would prefer now; it is rather what we must do if we would meet the obligations we have incurred to the cause of humanity and civilization. To do this will involve dealing in some way with the problem of the Philippines.

In dealing with this problem it is necessary to remember that it is not one but two-fold. There is the problem of that part of the group which has been to some extent occupied, in a certain limited sense governed, and in a very small degree civilized, by Spain; and there is the larger problem of the disposal of the greater part of the islands, of which none of these things can be said. With regard to Luzon, with its partial civilization, and its largely successful body of insurgents, it is impossible that we should simply abandon our position, for such a course would mean treachery to men whom we have treated as practically our allies, and equal treachery to the cause of humanity, for which we have undertaken the war. Whatever happens, it is evident that the position of the insurgents in Luzon must be provided for, at least to the extent of rescuing them from the vengeance of the Spanish government and people. It may well be argued that if we consider ourselves bound by the dictates of ordinary humanity to assure liberty to the insurgents and people of Cuba, we are not less bound to do as much for those of Luzon, where the power is even more completely in our hands. This might be done by recognizing a Republic of Luzon, and handing over the island, freed from Spanish control, to its own people, under a treaty by which Spain would agree not to attempt its reconquest. Unless we did more than this, indeed, the experiment would almost certainly prove a failure, and after a short period of anarchy and bloodshed our republican offspring would merge into the dominions of Japan, Germany, or France. If we went further and declared a protectorate, we should to all intents and purposes have to annex the island ourselves, or at least to submit to being saddled with the expenses and international complications incident to annexation, with a good deal less than its advantages and profits.

And even this would not be a possible solution of the difficulty

respecting two-thirds of the group. There cannot even be a nominal republic of the southern Philippines. Divided as they are among tribes, wholly uncivilized and wholly independent of one another, any possible bond of union must be a bond imposed from the outside for generations yet to come. The Spaniards have not, and never have had, more than small trading stations on these islands, and they have never even attempted to govern or to civilize them. The position is almost identical with that of the islands of New Zealand at the time when Britain annexed them to her empire nearly sixty years ago. The wonderful success which has attended that experiment affords the highest encouragement to any nation that will apply the methods which in that country have preserved and civilized the native race, but it proclaims emphatically that it can only be attained by a firm hand and a consistent policy. If this country should desire to preserve the southern Philippines on the one hand from native barbarism, and on the other from absorption by some foreign nation, whose policy would almost certainly be unfriendly to our commercial expansion, it can be done by treating them as an outlying territory of the United States, and practically in no other way. If left in Spanish hands, with one or more coaling and trading ports secured, they would be little better than a useless anxiety; if made the subject of another make-believe popular government, as was the case with Hawaii, they would eventually become territories after a period of comparative stagnation and anxiety.

It is, of course, for the Government and people of this country to say whether they will deal with the Philippines at all or not. It is for them to decide whether they desire that commercial expansion on the other side of the Pacific which can only be effectively secured by the possession of some territory nearer than our own Pacific coast; nearer, too, than our little rocky outpost of Hawaii. If we do not, then a treaty with Spain which shall at any rate nominally assure pardon for her Philippine rebels may possibly serve our turn. Should that not appear to us sufficient, we may demand that Luzon shall be set free to govern itself as best it can. In either case the result will almost certainly be the same; we shall have taken possession of the islands only to hand them back to a period of bloodshed and anarchy, to be followed by their annexation by some European or Asiatic power, which will give them something at least of peace and security, and in

return will probably receive wealth from their developed resources. If, on the other hand, this country should decide that she will accept the responsibility cast upon her by events, it is hardly too much to say that there is but one way in which she can do it effectively. She can discard the illusion of a self-governing republic, which could only mean the tyranny of a few half-castes over a large population, confessedly incapable of self-government, and treat the whole of the islands as a territory until she has developed their resources and civilized their people. The undertaking will be a serious one, but its success is more than a possibility, and its rewards would be substantial.

HUGH H. Lusk.